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CIVIL WAR AND THEORIES OF POWER IN BAROTS5-
LAND: AFRICAN AND MEDIEVAL ANALOGIES*
MAX GLUGKMAN't
TiE Lozi are the dominant tribe of Barotseland, and their king rules over
not only his own tribal people, but also members of twenty-five other tribal
groups. The Barotse Kingdom thus includes a total of 250,000 to 300,000
people who inhabit some 80,000 square miles in Northwestern Rhodesia. The
Lozi themselves live in the floodplain of the Upper Zambezi River, where it
runs south from the Congo parallel to the border of Angola. The plain is about
120 miles long and 25 to 35 miles wide. The Lozi build their villages on mounds
in the plain, and, when the Zambezi floods each year, many of them have to
abandon these villages to live for a few months in a second set of villages on
the margins of the plain. Other Lozi and some immigrants of other tribes dwell
permanently on the margins, while most of the conquered and immigrant tribes
of the kingdom dwell in the river-valleys and small water-containing depres-
sions that are interspersed among the woodlands encircling the plain. The
king maintains two capitals, one in the plain, the other at the margin.
In order to outline the very complicated Barotse political system, I shall
concentrate on how the system reflects Barotse theories of power.' This can
best be done by examining three sets of ideas: first, how the Barotse formulate
a theory of power providing for representation of different elements of the
state in their official organs; second, to what extent they consider their king
and other officials bound by law; and third, what are the laws of treason and
of succession to the throne.
At this point, I should emphasize that the Barotse theory of power is their
theory and not mine. It is not a theory abstracted by me from the facts.2 Since
the Barotse lacked writing, none of them has been able to set out this theory
as a full doctrine. But point by point, and with some interconnecting of various
*This article is adapted from one of four Storrs Lectures given by Professor Gluckman
at Yale University in Spring, 1963. The lectures delivered at Yale will comprise part of
Professor Gluckman's forthcoming book, The Ideas of Barotse Jurisprudence, to be pub-
lished by the Yale Press in 1964.
Professor Gluckman adds the following: "I am grateful to Professor Harry Street and
Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. for their clarifying comments on my article; and to my wife
who assisted me in finding my way through literature on mediaeval England, as well as in
the field in Barotseland; and to the Ford Foundation for a grant for my personal research
which I used in many ways."
-Professor of Social Anthropology, University of Manchester, England.
1. Fuller details of the Barotse political and administrative systems are given in GLUCx-
msAx, THE LOZI OF BAROTSELAND IN N ORTH-WEsTmERN R ODESIA (1951) and GLucKmuN,
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points, Barotse expounded these principles to me. If they did not surpass
Dicey in the sophistication of their insight into political powers involved in the
constitution, they certainly surpassed my own simplicity. They taught me more
than I could teach them. No one who has studied or worked in any political
system can fail to be impressed by the Barotse's penetrating insight into rela-
tions of power. It is curious that no other African society is yet reported to
have so elaborate a theory. This may perhaps be because other students have
not been interested in the problem. Yet, as I have said, the Barotse themselves
made clear their theory to me. The interesting question is why they should have
developed it so far. I do not imagine, of course, that they deliberately designed
the state's organs to cope with anxieties created by the theory, as your own
founders designed the division of powers within your constitution in reaction
to a theory of how Britain was ruled. Rather, the Barotse system must have
received its complex elaboration over a long period of time, with gradual ac-
cretions of officers and institutions. The theory surely must have followed as
an interpretation on the facts.
It is appropriate to start this description of the Barotse political structure
with a myth, since myths reputedly are the stock-in-trade of anthropologists.
According to Lozi mythology, the royal family is descended from a daughter
of God Nyambe, whom he took as his wife. One of their sons, a member of the
Lozi tribe, was out hunting on the plain, which was then inhabited by many
tribes, and members of a foreign tribe decided it would be polite to present him
with part of their catch of fish. The Lozi were impressed by this propriety,
when compared with their own practice of keeping all catches for themselves.
So they chose this son of God Nyambe and his daughter to be king and agreed
to give him part of their produce. Although God and the wife he created to
bear the mother of the first king lie only ten generations back from the present-
day king, the Barotse do not think of this as a limited number of generations.
I doubt if any of them has ever counted the generations: for the Barotse they
cover almost the whole of time. They believe the events narrated in the myth
occurred only slightly later than the beginning of creation.
This myth emphasizes that the kingship was established by the people, who
themselves undertook the obligation to render tribute. Thus, there inheres an
idea of a contract between king and people. The myth also hallows the kingship
because the family which claims the kingship is descended from God, mated
with his own daughter. All eighteen of the Barotse kings have come from that
ancestral origin, by virtue of agnatic descent.3 It is inconceivable that someone
not thus descended from the line of kings should gain the throne. During re-
volts by powerful councillors against a king and his favorites, the rebels have
had to find an ambitious prince, or even cajole a reluctant prince, into leading
them. Hence revolts attacked particular kings, but not the kingship or the
3. The third king in modem versions was a son of God, own mother's brother to the
first king and a son of God. The first European records gave him as younger brother. See
GLUCKMAN, THE Lozi OF BAROTSELAND IN NOpTH-WESTERN RHODESIA 2-3 (1951) and
SEVEN TRIBES OF BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA (Colson and Gluckman ed. 1951).
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rights of the royal family to it. They were dearly rebellions and not revolu-
tions. 4
The princes are very numerous for kings had many wives, though prince-
liness is lost when a man's tie to a reigning king is more than three or four
generations away. Descent through a princess within this range still transmits
princeliness, but this female link bars a man from the kingship. Among the
agnatic descendants of kings, anyone is eligible to be selected by the national
council, but ideally candidates should be the product of a union between a
reigning king and a woman on whom one of a number of queenly titles has
been conferred. This is the Barotse definition of being born in the purple.
Barotse who can speak English define the kingship as "a constitutional
monarchy." The king is supposed to legislate and judge only with the consent
of his councils, and to take action only through their members. A simplified
explanation of these councils will help demonstrate Barotse ideas about their
government. When the king sits in full court, his magnates are seated in three
divisions about his throne. On his right sit the most powerful councillors, as
well as a number of junior councillors. These councillors-of-the-right are said
by the Barotse to represent the common people and the commoners' interests
in the kingship, which are seen as distinct from the interests of the royal
family and the reigning king in that kingship. The reigning king's interests are
represented by councillors who sit on his left. I shall refer to these men as the
king's stewards, because besides acting as judges and national administrators
they, rather more than councillors-of-the-right, have the duty of looking after
the king's property, his queens, and princes and princesses. The Barotse refer
to them as "wives" or "boys" of the king because, theoretically at least, they
look mainly to the reigning king's own interests.
A third group is constituted by the princes and the husbands of princesses.
This group represents the interests of the royal family in the kingship, as
against the reigning king; in council, this group, symbolically, sits facing the
king.
The full court is thus seen as a balance around kingship of the interests of
nation, reigning king, and royal family, somewhat in the way in which we in
Britain think of our Sovereign in Parliament, if we equate Lords with royal
descent. And, like the British Parliament, the Barotse councils can only act
constitutionally if all three elements are represented. In making up a delegation
to report or discuss matters with the British Government, or at another
capital, the Barotse always take care to see that the delegation contains mem-
bers of each set in the council. Similarly, the senior councillor-of-the-right will
always stop a trial if he sees that there are too few members of each set present
at that moment.
Like the British, too, the Barotse think that membership in one part of the
council is inimical to membership in another part; however, many councillors-
4. The implications of this situation are examined in GLUcKMAN, ORDER A.D RE-
BEuxoN ix T=mA AnicA (1963) and more fully developed and differentiated in GLucK-
irANr, RuL, LAW AND RrruAL ix TmAL SocraY (in press).
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of-the-right and stewards are married to princesses and are entitled to sit in
the royal division in their capacity as royal consort, as well as with their com-
moner fellows. But, normally, princes by descent in any line from a recent
king should not be appointed to councillorships-on-the-right, or to steward-
ships. Such an appointment would vest more power in those princes to intrigue
against the king. Moreover, the Barotse believe that they should not be ap-
pointed as councillors-of-the-right because their interests as princes might
conflict with their duty to represent the common people.
This latter reason applies particularly to the chief councillor-of-the-right,
who holds the title "Ngambela." The king is closely identified with this chief
councilor, who is appointed by the king and acts as his principal adviser and
executive. However, the Ngambela, by his appointment, moves into a titled
position which is independent of the king. Although the king can secure the
deposition of a particular incumbent, the Barotse do not consider it possible
for a king to abolish the Ngambelaship. Therefore, Barotse speak of the
Ngambela, in relation to the king, as "another chief or king." The Ngambela
is thus seen by Barotse both as servant to the king and as independent of and
opposed to the king. It would, of course, be foolish of a king to appoint a
prince, thus granting great power to a potential rival for the throne. The people
would be equally concerned by such an appointment. They ask: How can a
prince represent us against the king? Even when a prince who was barred
from kingship by descent through a princess was appointed Ngambela in 1921,
the common people predicted disaster. And their predictions were fulfilled
when, eight years later, he was deposed after being charged with murder and
sedition.
Theoretically the king is a member of all courts and he confirms all verdicts
reached in the capital. Even in the district courts, which he does not visit, he
is held to confirm the verdict if the losing party does not say he will appeal,
and the successful litigant gives the royal salute to the court building. Hence
the king cannot be tried by a court or bring suit in court: for, in addition to
such immunity as he possesses from his august status, Barotse hold that no
man can be judge in his own cause. For this reason, treason cases were not
tried in court; rather, the king acted outside the courts.- It is interesting to note
the similarity on this point of Barotse law and the English medieval law of
treason. According to Pollock and Maitland 5 when there was "a charge of
treason [in England], the king himself [was] the accuser, and life, limb and
inheritance [were] at stake; therefore it [was] not seemly that the king,
either in person or by his justices, who represent[ed] his person, should be
judge; so Bracton throws out the suggestion that the cause should come before
the 'peers.'" Thus in England, as well as Barotseland, there evolved a special
rule for all cases of high treason based on the maxim that "no one should be
judge in his own cause."
Another Barotse rule states that "the king does nothing." By this they mean
that the king should not personally try to implement any of his wishes or
5. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 410 (2d ed. 1905).
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orders, because if in so doing he trespasses on the rights of a subject, it is
impossible for that subject to seek redress in court. Here again note the parallel
to English medieval concepts. Vinogradoff, from his analysis of the Year
Books; reports the following:
... Sir John Markham, Chief Justice of the King's Bench in the time of
Edward IV, had told this king that he could not personally arrest a sub-
ject on suspicion of treason, while one of his lieges could, and this for the
reason that if the king did wrong, nobody could have an action against
him.6
The Barotse take very seriously the constitutional doctrine that the king
must not act himself lest he bar a subject from suit in court. One of their kings,
who ruled after the British protectorate was established, disapproved strongly
of beer-drinking and pased laws to control it. He once discovered and broke the
beer-pots of some subjects in his capital. His councillors made him vacate his
chair on the dais in court, and sit on the ground, where they harangued him
severely, and told him that if he wanted to be a policeman, instead of a king,
they would dress him in uniform and send him around the country looking for
malefactors. I was told that had it not been for the pleas of white officials and
missionaries, the king would have been deposed. The theory is that the king
should only act through his officials, since they can be sued by aggrieved per-
sons. Although the king can do no wrong for which he can be tried, if he
continuously commits or orders actions which affect a subject, he is liable to
deposition. But it is difficult to criticize the king in connection with such ac-
tions. Where litigants accuse an official of acting under the king's explicit
directions, they may open themselves to a charge of slander. And though
everyone knows that in many of these cases a trespassing official has done
wrong under the instructions of the king, he cannot plead those instructions in
his defense. If he does, he is accused of an offense, "working or spoiling the
king's name," for which he can be severely punished. Therefore, an official
ordered by a king to carry out an arbitrary action should refuse to obey orders
and seek the support of -the council for his refusal.
I did not check carefully enough the various versions of the king's threatened
deposition, but my notes indicate that he was not tried as ordinary malefactors
are, since no case was made against him nor did he put forward a defence. He
only pleaded for forgiveness. The offence was here public and obvious. An
analogous instance, although more properly a plot than a trial, involved the
"removal" of an early Barotse king who was a cannibal. The Council, in secret,
discussed his villainous habit and decided to kill him. Since he could not swim,
it was relatively simple to dispose of him. Holes were bored in his barge and
he was taken out in the river and left to drown, since the blood of a king
should not be shed. His escorting councillors swam ashore.
The rule that a man cannot be tried in the court of which he is "owner," as
the Barotse put it, is also shown in a case in 1948 when the then-ruling
Ngambela was tried on a charge of neglecting the health of his king who had
6. 1 Vixoor.RtF, CoL.cEr PAPzEs 196 (1928).
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recently died.7 The councillors held that he could not be tried in the highest
court of the land, since he was its head, and a special court of all the men of
the nation was summoned to hear the case. In such cases, the constitutional de-
cision that a special court was necessary may have been influenced by the
desire to assess public reaction. In a sense, however, since the Ngambela, when
acting officially, represents the nation, the nation as a whole and it alone is
superior to him.
Other officials, however, can be sued in the regular courts for acting ar-
bitrarily. When such an official is sued he is made to leave his seat on one of
the special mats for court members as the king who broke pots was made to
leave his "throne." Adherence to this rule was indicated, although indirectly,
in a case where a foreigner from Tanganyika, accused of theft, complained that
he stood alone against the whole Barotse nation. The judges replied that "the
law does not choose," i.e., it is impartial, and a senior judge said that the
councillors too were "slaves of the law" and if any did wrong, they would be
made to sit in the accused's position.8
The king also does not in person sue or prosecute a subject, for this would
rob that subject of his right to oppose the suit. A situation which illustrates
this principle arose in 1899 when Major St. Hill Gibbons was surveying
Barotseland with the help of the then king. The two councillors the king bad
assigned as guides refused to continue with Gibbons, and he was compelled to
turn back. When he complained to the king, the retrogrades were tried in the
court for disobeying the king's orders, given to them in council. However, the
king himself apparently did not appear in court as plaintiff or as judge. Instead
the charge was levelled against them by a son-in-law of the king. The charge
read: "You ... are accused of disobeying the king's orders, inasmuch as you
made it impossible for the white man to continue his journey, and complete the
work he had undertaken in the interests of the king.... What excuse for your
conduct do you make?" The accused produced specious pleas, which the
judges demolished. 9
The Barotse council has manifold functions. The council judges disputes,
debates matters of national importance and legislates, issues instructions on
many matters, distributes the national land for the king, discusses national
hunts (and, in the past, wars), and arranges for the appointment of priests
and the carrying out of sacrifices at royal cenotaphs. These duties and re-
sponsibilities mean for the Barotse that the councillors are the state and its
law. Hence, it is demanded of them that they be grave, judicious, impartial,
and brave. The Barotse see a basic incompatibility between these qualities and
the use of violence. Therefore a councillor, like the king, must never himself
use force-he must never act as if he were, in modern Barotse parlance, "a
policeman." I recorded several cases where councillors were tried and fined,
7. Important political changes and intrigues were involved in this charge.
8. GLUCKMAN, THE JuDIcIAL PRocEss AMONG THE BARoTSE or NORTUERN RiiODvsIA
203, 228-29 (1955).
9. Id. at 161-62.
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and at least threatened with deposition, for using force.10 I once asked a
prince, who was my clerk, to use his prestige to control an unruly crowd who
were preventing me from photographing a dance. He replied that he could not,
because if the crowd abused or maltreated him, the council would punish him
for provoking their offense against his princeliness. For this reason, when the
council sends one of its members to oversee the carrying out of its orders or
one of its judgments, and there is reason to anticipate opposition, he should be
accompanied by police who may use whatever force is necessary.
I recorded one illuminating case of the suspension of these rules. In 1912 the
cattle of the Ngambela damaged crops of a policeman. The policeman hit and
injured the Ngambela's son who was herding the cattle. The policeman also
came into the council in war-dress, with his shield and spears. The king de-
clared that he was making war and must not enter the council. The Ngambela
was allowed to divest himself temporarily of his position---"he took off his
Ngambelaship" said the Barotse to me-and he fought the policeman, choking
him until he defaecated. The Ngambela then resumed his Ngambelaship. As
the policeman had made war and had not sued, he was held to have lost his
right to sue in court; but the Ngambela of his own free will paid a beast for
the damage to the crops.1 1 The description of this case as it was given to me
makes clear that the Ngambela could have been sued by the policeman, had
the latter not taken to arms. This supports Barotse statements that like any
other councillor, the Ngambela when prosecuted privately is "a slave of the
law" and abandons his office, though Barotse assured me that the Ngambela,
like the king, so far from resisting a valid complaint from a subordinate, vAill
by grace give more redress than is due, as befits a great chief.
I have stated that the Barotse conceive of the king and the Ngambela as
"two different kinds of kings." For "king" they use the term midena, which
can be translated as king, chief, lord, or sir. This word they have taken from
the language of a group of Basuto (the Kololo), who fought their way north-
wards out of Basutoland, 1,000 miles to the southeast, to conquer and rile
Barotseland from 1838 to 1864. Consequently Barotse often call their king
"the great mulena," in order to distinguish between the king and the other
lords. In their original language they refer to the king as Litunga, which is one
of a number of words restricted to "things of kingship." It means "the Earth,"
and the king's full title is "great one of the earth," or even "great-one-the-
Earth." The title Litunga is applied also to the ruler of another capital, lying
about 30 miles south of the king's capital. This ruler, who has always been a
princess since the Barotse reconquered their homeland from the Basuto and
reestablished their system of rule, has a capital which duplicates that of the
king, and she is entitled to use certain royal emblems which royal rulers at
provincial capitals are not entitled to use. She is the only other Litunga, but
her title is qualified adjectivally as "the-earth-of-the-south." This restricted use
of Litunga emphasizes the unique character of these tvo pre-eminent rulers,
10. Id. at 83.
11. Id. at 89.
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and places them on a different plane from any other authority. It identifies
them with the land itself.
A number of praise-songs containing historical lore and proverbial wisdom
are attached to every Barotse title. One of the Ngambela's praise-songs states
that "the king is owner of Loziland and its trees and his [own] servants, and
its cattle [game, fish, birds] ; the Ngambela is owner of the Lozi people." This
praise emphasizes that the Ngambela as owner of the people is empowered to
control their actions, and has major responsibilities in representing them. The
king is contrasted with the Ngambela in the praise-saying, which states that
he is removed from the actual exercise of rule, save over his own servants.
But he alone is the owner of the land and of its riches, the trees and the wild
creatures and domesticated cattle. The people derive their subsistence from
these and hence they are indebted to him for their lives. When I was in
Barotseland, the right of the king to tribute had been long abolished by agree-
ment with the British Government. The king's stewards had sent a request to
the people of a certain district to bring in bark and roots to make the great
fishing-net of the king, and had told them they would be paid for their goods.
When they brought these to the capital, they refused payment. They were
summoned into council and the presiding councillor reminded them that tribute
was abolished and they were entitled to payment. They insisted: "How can we
take payment from the king, our father, for things which are his, when we live
by his bounty?" At least until 1947, when I last visited Barotseland, this
feeling was still strong. It was a principle insisted on by judges, both at the
capital and in courts far in the bush, that the land was the king's, even though
all of his subjects were entitled to be given gardens in it and to use its public
pastures, woods and waters.1 2
The doctrine that the king owns the land, and that allegiance is due to him
because he allows his subjects to use it, places him in an entirely different
category from the Ngambela or any commoner councillor, however powerful.
For the Barotse, it gives to the kingship a unique element of continuity. The
nation depends on the land to survive, and the king is more than owner of
the land; he is the land. When he is installed, he spends a night in lonely vigil
by a sacred pool out of which is supposed to come a monster, symbolizing the
forces of nature, to lick and consecrate him. He is not a divine king, in that
the Barotse do not believe, as do some African tribes, that the fertility and
prosperity of the land depend on the king's physical well-being, so that they
require that he be slain ritually if his powers begin to fail. But Barotse do
think of the king as embodying the well-being and the fertility of the nation.
The spirits of ancestral kings are buried in cenotaphs, marked by specially
planted trees so that they stand out on the treeless plain; and these spirits
control the prosperity of the nation as a whole and of its individual members.
Sacrifices and offerings were, and to a lesser extent still are, made at these
12. The relation between the king's subjects' rights in land is the theme of another
chapter in the book which will encompass the entire series of lectures, GLUCKMAN, Tn.
IDEAS oF BARoTsE JuRIsPRuDENcE (in press).
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cenotaphs. When he dies the ruling king will have his own centotaph. And
when he dies, it is said that "the nation falls into a coma." All fires in the land
should be extinguished, and fire should then be taken from the hearth of his
successor and carried through the land so that the nation warms itself and
cooks its food by the fires of the new king. In brief, the dead king is ritually
buried, to continue to serve the nation as a spirit, and his successor, ritually in-
stalled, by actions involving extra-sensory powers. In contrast, the Ngambela
is installed with the ceremony of symbolic actions, but these do not involve
such powers; and he is buried as a private citizen.
Even more than the Ngambela or the council, the king is symbolically as-
sociated with law and justice. Since the council apparently does most of the
ruling, it is more liable to commit injustice than the king. Moreover, the king
can pardon by grace of mercy, despite the law, as council cannot. Indeed, ob-
taining royal sanctuary became so important that a special jurisdiction was
founded so the king could exercise directly the royal prerogative of mercy.
Anything connected with the king is regarded as a sanctuary from execution of
the council's punishments. If a condemned man can escape from the council
and get to the royal palace or a royal centotaph, or the courtyard of any of the
queens, or to the private storehouse where the king keeps his personal proper-
ty, he is temporarily reprieved. The king's life itself is also symbolized in cer-
tain drums, which play periodically through the night and the day; and some
of these drums and his bandsmen should always be in the council. If the con-
victed accused can seize hold of a drum or a bandsman, he is in sanctuary. The
king will himself hear the man's plea, instead of listening only to the council's
report on the trial and confirming or rejecting its judgment. At the least he is
likely to soften the punishment. Most importantly, the sanctuary of mercy
which resides in the king and royalty is represented by a councillor-of-the-
right, who sits just beyond the Ngambela, and is therefore second in seniority.
He is the Natamoyo, the Giver-of-life or the Mother-of-life; and this is the
only titled position (it exists at both northern and southern capitals) which
must be filled by a senior prince.13 Thus, royalty is brought into the midst of
the great commoners to represent mercy. If a suppliant can get to the Giver-
of-life in the council, or if he can flee to this councillor's courtyard, he is re-
prieved. But the temptations open to the Giver-of-life have sparked a tradi-
tional Barotse chariness of the ambivalent effect of power on an individual.
The Barotse are apparently terrified of giving power, even power to protect;
for once a man is elevated, it is feared he will stand against those for whom he
ought to care. If a member of royalty is seated among commoners to protect
the people, he may become so puffed with power that he abuses it. Therefore,
the Barotse attach to the Giver-of-life a deputy, or assistant, whose person and
13. One other prince, Mboo Sipopa, sat fairly low among the councillors-of-the-right.
He was extremely dissatisfied at being passed over for the kingship, since his father Sipopa
had driven out the Basuto. He was given the 18th seat on the right (he sat third among the
royals) as a solace, where he represented his father who did not form a political sector on
the Barotse pattern.
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courtyard are also sanctuaries, and who restrains the Giver-of-life and acts in
his absence. However, the Lozi consider it inappropriate openly to have one
prince as deputy to another prince, with authority to rebuke him, since princes
are in theory rivals for power. For this reason, the title of Assistant to the
Giver-of-life has to be occupied by a commoner relative of a prominent royal
personage, or by a prince so distant from the ruling line that he is beginning to
merge into the commonalty. Thus, this deputy is drawn from the ranks of
those who are neither quite commoners nor quite princes.
The complicated Barotse theory of power is manifested in another way. The
Giver-of-life is placed among the great commoners to represent the king as the
fountainhead of justice and mercy. Yet he there becomes associated with the
commoners, and, accordingly, assumes the commoners' obligation to check the
king if he abuses his power or plans unwise action. The late king told a senior
British official that the Giver-of-life must chide the king when he has done
wrong, criticism which could not be tolerated from anyone else but a very
special relative. It is interesting that no Giver-of-life, according to the records
I have of recent reigns, has ever become king, though one Giver-of-life became
chief at a provincial capital. I did not inquire into the possibility that appoint-
ment to a position which allowed criticism of the king, barred access to the
kingship itself and therefore eliminated its princely occupant as a possible rival.
About power the Barotse are hard-headed realists. Royal sanctuaries exist
primarily to restrict oppression by the council. But kings also abuse their
power; and against this abuse the council provides sanctuary. A man con-
demned by the king is temporarily reprieved, and his case will be examined, if
he can get to the council house, or to the royal storehouse where the council
keeps the national drums on which the king is seated at his coronation, or to
the Ngambela or his courtyard. Yet even this is not enough. King and coun-
cil may combine to oppress a man. A condemned man can then flee and seek
sanctuary with the princess who is "earth-of-the-south," and the northern
capital should not bring pressure on her to repatriate him. Exactly the same
sanctuaries, including the title Giver-of-life and its royal-commoner assistant,
exist in the southern capital, and, conversely, final sanctuary from the south
lies in the northern capital.
When I myself was working in Barotseland, I could not observe the opera-
tion of this elaborate set of sanctuaries since the main sanction for abuse of power
was provided by British authorities. I was told many tales of how men sought
sanctuary under different circumstances, and it was not reported in one tale
that those in power refused to recognize the sanctuary. I was told, too, that
the drums of all chiefs were sanctuaries for defeated enemies in battle; bands-
men were sacrosanct, and when an army broke in battle, its warriors were re-
prieved from slaughter if they could get to the drummers of their own or the
conquering chief. I met men who had been succoured thus, and then adopted,
into the Barotse nation.
I have tried to show that the Barotse constitution is seen by Barotse as an
elaboration of their theory that power may corrupt, and that those in power
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must be checked if they are not to disregard the obligations they owe to their
subordinates. This thesis is further evidenced in the concepts of the private
Ngambela of the king and the Ngambela of the Ngambela. I have described
how the Ngambela is appointed by the king to serve the king, and as a result
of that appointment gets power to stand against the king on behalf of the
commonalty. Yet since the Ngambela may turn against both the king and the
people whose interests he represents, each king, aside from appointing a state
Ngambela, also appoints "his own Ngambela." The king attaches a large
number of men to this new private Ngambela, who thus become a powerful
counterpoise to the state Ngambela.14 In addition, the state Ngambela also has
his own Ngambela specially charged with restraining the state Ngambela
should he abuse his power over the people whose interests he primarily repre-
sents. This Ngambela of the Ngambela sits with his own title high among the
councillors of the right-that is, near to the king. Ngambelaship thus is a
generic concept for the Barotse. It denotes assistant, deputy, and also pro-
tector against the represented superior; and it is applied to all situations in
Barotse life which involve the delegating of power. For example, the assistant
sanctuary to the Giver-of-life can be spoken of as the latter's Ngambela. I must
stress yet again that each time power is delegated thus, the person who re-
ceives it from his superior is considered to hold power in some senses in op-
position to the giver and as a check upon him.
The idea of balancing powers in this way is carried a stage further by the
council in its discussion of all matters affecting national interests. I have de-
scribed how, from one perspective, the stewards represent the reigning king,
the princes and husbands of princesses represent the royal family, and the
councillors-of-the-right represent the commonalty. But because of their posi-
tion as officials and persons of power, great councillors, stewards and royals
tend to look on problems similarly. Therefore, according to Barotse theory,
even the representatives of the commonalty cease to be aware of the manner
in which ordinary folk are affected. Hence, the Barotse say, they divided their
council horizontally along the middle to debate matters of national importance.
All the senior councillors-of-the-right, the senior stewards, and the senior
princes and husbands of senior princesses, were formed into a single chamber.
The very large number of men holding junior titles-on-the-right, or junior
stewardships, and less important royals, who sat behind the rows of senior
men in full council, were formed into a second chamber. When legislation, or
matters such as making war or accepting missionaries were debated, these two
chambers separated. The chamber of senior men met in the courtyard of the
Ngambela or in the council house; the chamber of juniors met in the court-
14. As kings have followed this practice through the course of Lozi history, the ap-
pointment of each new king's own "Ngambela' has pushed the titles of the private Ngambelas
of ancient kings further and further away from the royal throne in the official hierarchy.
They move downwards in the order of seating, and speak earlier in debate, thus losing
relative authority. They also lose followers to the holders of the newly established titles.
Accordingly, their secular power decreases; but since they represent more ancient kings,
they are regarded with greater reverence.
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yard of their leader (their Ngambela) or in the council house. But now that
the juniors were separated out, the junior chamber became of equivalent status
to the chamber of their seniors. The junior were called by a term meaning
"men," "warriors," "veterans," and in the words of the senior councillors to me,
"They are another kind of chiefs." In theory, and I think also in fact, the
junior chamber knew more of the people's wishes and feelings, since they spent
more time away from the capital. The system was not working while I was in
Barotseland, 15 but I was told that the senior chamber hesitated to force its will
upon the other chamber, and that the king on occasion took the junior cham-
ber's advice against the senior chamber's. The leader of the junior chamber
sat also in the senior chamber: he moved backnvards and forwards between the
chambers, reporting the others' deliberations as they strove to reach unanimity.
Barotse themselves say that the senior chamber represented the capital, whose
interests on many matters diverged from those of the ordinary folk, who there-
fore had to be represented by the junior chamber. It was as if in the British
Parliament, leaders of Government and Opposition in both Lords and Com-
mons were set against the backbenchers of both parties from both houses-
those with power or hope of power set against those without power or hope of
power.
These two chambers met in the day; and they were seen as jointly opposed
to a council which met at night in the king's palace. Here the king met at
night in his drummer's shed with the state Ngambela, the Giver-of-life, the
king's private Ngambela, the chief steward, and anyone else he chose to sum-
mon, to discuss in whispers news coming in from the country, and to formulate
policy to put before the chambers of the day, or to consider their advice. And
here Barotse constitutional doctrine and theories established yet another check.
All the councils and chambers previously considered were filled with men; but
in the secrecy of the palace at night two women were drawn in to check the
power elsewhere reserved for men. As the king debated matters with what
literate Barotse describe-not inaptly-as his Privy Council, two officially ap-
pointed women, one a princess and one a commoner, eavesdropped outside the
drummers' shed. Their duty as women, appreciative of the tender feelings of
the people, was to warn the king if his great magnates were giving him ad-
vice which would antagonize the people. They were known as Anatambumu,
Mothers-of-the-king.
The division between the northern and southern capitals also complicated
debate. In the past, there was no appeal from the south to the north in suits
at law: both rulers were Litunga, or kings, and "how can you appeal from one
king to another?" But on matters such as the waging of war, passing new
laws, agreements with the whites, matters had to be referred from the north to
the southern capital, which had the same arrangement of divisions and of
15. A chamber with the same name was set up in 1947 to represent the mass of people.
Its place was filled by holders of old titles, and some persons were elected to it. The vicls-
situdes it underwent lie beyond the scope of this analysis.
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chambers within its council. In the end, northern opinion prevailed. But if
there was radical disagreement, the councillors of the south might come to the
northern capital, where the two councils combined into a single council in
which holders of titles in the two capitals sat in a well-established order of
seniority. First, near the throne sat the Ngambela of the north, then the
husband of the female "King-of-the-south" since he represented a "king";
then the Giver-of-life of the north, then the head of the southern capital, then
the king's private Ngambela, then the Giver-of-life of the south, and so on.
This summary description of the Barotse constitution inevitably raises this
question: How did so complex a system of checks and balances, of devolutions
of power and establishments of power, work in practice? The sophistication in
the theory may not be wholly confirmed by the way the Barotse authorities
actually exercised power, or by the effectiveness of the restraints on that
exercise of power. Unfortunately, I can only suspect this divorce between
theory and practice. It was impossible for me to confirm this suspicion through
a detailed analysis of the actual application of the theory of power; the system
was not operating fully when I was studying it because the British Govern-
ment had superimposed on it a new organization.
However, this much I can say. Before the coming of the whites, Barotse
society was not faced with problems arising out of radical change. Matters for
debate cannot often have provoked differences of opinion in terms of the dif-
fering status of the councillors. Problems were of this kind: Shall we wage
war this year, and if so, against whom? Where shall we hunt? Have we
enough food to dig another canal to carry canoes in the dry season or drain
the waterlogged peaty margins of the plain to provide gardens? If so, where
shall we dig the canal? Occasionally, traditions show, there was legislation to
change private law. Much discussion, according to the tales, proceeded over
the faults of various councillors. In olden times debate must have proceeded
slowly, out of sheer enjoyment of debating. Once there was a long debate
when, after the defeat of the Basuto conquerors, the king decided to re-intro-
duce the ancient Barotse system of rule, and revolt was provoked. However,
there was generally little opportunity for the complex Barotse theory of power
to be tested during this period. Only with the coming of the whites did radical
problems begin to emerge on which points of view were sharply divided across
the sets of councillors-of-the-right, stewards and royals, and across senior and
junior chambers.
Unlike the South African tribes, the Barotse did not regularly summon
meetings of all male citizens to consider important matters. The capital
dominated the political system, with consequences I shall soon discuss. Only
twice to my knowledge were meetings of the nation's men summoned. Once, as
cited above, it was to try a state Ngambela for neglecting his King's welfare.
The other occasion was when the council had to decide whether to accept the
offer of the British South Africa Company's protection, and an annual subsidy,
in return for granting mineral rights. The council divided sharply on this issue,
and it finally summoned a meeting of all the men of the nation near the
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capital. 6 These "gatherings of the nation" were exceptional arrangements to
meet major crises.
In order fully to understand the operation and derivation of the Barotse
theory of power, an examination of the close relation between the theory and
the Barotse social structure is essential. Since the rich and powerful could not
with their available goods and technology live in much finer houses or sur-
round themselves with relatively luxurious furnishings and bedeck themselves
with fine clothes, there was no point in attempting to exercise their power so as
to profit by sweating the labour or expropriating the goods of underlings.
Rather, they used their control over land and goods to build up direct rela-
tionships of loyalty and prestige with many followers. Men from distant tribes
have described to me how the king would reward them, when they brought in
their own tribute, with gifts of other products which they lacked and which
had been rendered in tribute by others. The others, in their turn, had been
similarly rewarded. A British official of that period has described how the
king by drawing in tribute and then distributing it to others acted as a kind
of bank and market, allocating goods between the various parts of Barotse-
land.17 From the crops produced by tribute labour in the king's many gardens,
he fed his people. His cattle were distributed to be herded by people who
lived off these cattle. The king could not draw on these herds without at
least the formal permission of the herder, who could protest if too many were
taken from him.'8 Even the first missionary in Barotseland, who regarded the
king as a tyrant, has described how the king bought goods from caravans of
traders from the South and from the West Coast and gave these out to his
people. 1 And when Portuguese traders and Arab slavers from the East Coast
reached Barotseland, the king sold only a few people to them in order to get
guns, and then forbade trade in people, probably because the Barotse had
sufficient ivory and beeswax to obtain the goods they wanted, and because they
were themselves always short of labour to meet the demands of their produc-
tive system.20 In practice, of course, the king and his councillors drew on the
tribute of goods and labour from subjects to maintain the capital, but the in.
herent limitations of the technological and economic system, and their own
interests in securing the allegiance of people, restricted actions on their part
which could be described as exploitative.
Because of these economic and technological limitations, the council's divi-
sions into sets of commoner councillors, of stewards representing the reigning
king, and of royals, and the superimposed division into the chambers of the
16. See CoIUARD, ON THE THRESHOLD OF CErTaL AFRICA 356-57 (2d ed. 1902).
17. Coryndon, first British Resident in Barotseland, cited in GANN, THE Biru oF A
PLURAL SocET 5 (1958).
18. Discussed in another chapter of Professor Gluckman's forthcoming book, note 12
supra.
19. CoILLARD, ON THE THRESHOLD OF CENTRAL AFRICA 301 (2d ed. 1903).
20. See GANN, THE END OF THE SLAVE-TRADE IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRmcA (1954).
For this productive system see GLUcKMAN, EcONOMY OF THE CENTRAL BAo0rs. PLAIN
(1941), summarized in THE Lozi OF BAROTSELAND IN NORTH-WESTERN RuODVSIA (1951.)
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capital and of the ordinary folk, did not therefore reflect deep and fundamental,
or potentially revolutionary, cleavages in the nation. There were not such
diverse and conflicting interests as lay behind the Houses of Lords and of
Commons, at least in the later Parliaments of England. However, some hos-
tility, based on a conflict of interests, existed between Barotse royalty and
commoners. Commoners have explained to me that they would never select a
prince born or begotten in their family as main heir to their estate, -'_ because
he would then draw the estate permanently away from them and vest it in the
royal family. But I found no evidence to indicate that the many-wived and
therefore prolific royal family was ousting commoners from their estates, as
Evans-Pritchard reports the spreading noble class has done among the Anuak
and the Shilluk of the Sudan,2 2 and as the cattle-keeping conquerors ap-
propriated lands from the peasants they subjugated around Lake Victoria
Nyanza.2 3 Rather, in Barotseland, the kings built new mounds for royal vil-
lages and drained peaty land for surrounding gardens. Princes and princesses
then had to attract followers to these new villages. Marc Bloch notes that the
extensive land clearance beginning in Europe in the twelfth century resulted in
the offer by lords of such favourable conditions to attract pioneers as the as-
surance that "they would not be subject to the arbitrary authority of the lord."
Men could change their lords, and land was sought after in order to hold
men.24 So it was in Barotseland, where a high rate of infant mortality and a
low expectation of life meant a relatively slow increase in population if it
increased at all. The Lozi kings even raided for children in their own
provinces to colonize the plain. These children, unlike serfs captured in war,
had normal free status and were assimilated to the dominant Lozi tribe, in
which they became representatives of their relatives in the other tribes.
Though the people seem at no point to have opposed the institutions of
kingship and council, they did fear individual and arbitrary acts of tyranny,
by king or councillor. Africa has had its Caligulas and Neros, as well as its
Aureliuses and Antonines. There was Shaka, the Zulu king, who ordered a
warrior to be executed because the unfortunate fellow's face made Shaka laugh
until his sides ached. But, according to their traditions, the Barotse had few
such kings. I have already mentioned the early king, raised in foreign parts,
who ate people and who was drowned by his councillors. In addition to him,
only one of the other eight Barotse kings who ruled before the Basuto con-
quest is reported to have been a general tyrant; he was attacked, although un-
21. Barotse land tenure is considered in another chapter of Professor Glucknan's
forthcoming book, note 12 supra.
22. EvANs-PrrcHARD, PoIcIcAL SYSTEM OF THE ANUAK OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTrAN
SUDAN (1940); EvANs-PRrrcHARD, THE DIVINE KINGSHIP OF THE SHILLUK OF THE
NnoTIc SuDAw (1948).
23. Se; e.g., MAQuET, THE PREMISE OF INEQUALITY fN RUANDA (1961) and OEcRG,
THE KINGDOM OF ANKOLE IN UGANDA (1940). There is a general discussion of these situa-
tions in Professor Gluckman's forthcoming RuLE, LAW AND ,rruAL iN TnAx Soqmizr,
note 4 supra.
24. BLOCH, FEUDAL Socizry 244, 251, 276 (1961).
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successfully, by the chief of south. And because of his cruelty, he was not
mourned after his death. The fourth king, although not a general tyrant, tried
to kill all his sons. The people were able to save only two sons to provide for
the succession. This same king also put certain bans on one of the neighbour-
ing tribes which he only conquered after many defeats. Yet the Barotse legends
of their early period describe no general revolts against tyrants. Indeed, most
kings were praised for their kindness.
The Barotse emphasize that their kings were bound by the law, and that if
a king ruled cruelly, his council and people were entitled to rebel against him
and to try to dispose of him, but such revolts were rare. The legends do report
frequent attacks on the king by the ruler of the southern capital, attempting to
gain the kingship, and occisions where the southern ruler disputed the succes-
sion to the Barotse kingship with the prince chosen in the north as heir. The
idea of legitimated civil war waged by royal claimants is strongly entrenched in
Lozi tradition. Civil war to attain power, perhaps even independence, is even
validated by Lozi mythology. According to one myth, after the first king was
installed, he and one of his younger brothers fell out with each other. The
younger brother had miraculous power-a common attribute of the younger
brother or sister in all mythology and folk tales. By virtue of these powers he
outwitted the king, and then moved south, altering the landscape as he went,
Here he established by conquest his own kingdom, where in time he was
persistently attacked by the fourth king. This king too was outwitted by
magical powers, till at last the king of the south, saying he was worn out, dis-
appeared into the ground with his councillors, people, cattle and possessions.
Only the pegs and ropes with which his cattle were tethered and his porridge
stirrers were left, and these grew into tall trees which still stand to mark
the most sacred and powerful royal cenotaph in the land.
This myth and other legends of civil strife hallow the right of princes to
compete for the kingship, vi et armis, thus legitimating civil war, and making
it part of the Barotse constitution. Tradition does not reproach the southern
princes with breach of loyalty; it is in the nature and the accredited role of
all princes, southern or northern, to struggle for the kingship. Princely attacks
on the king were thus not considered treasonable in Barotse law, and though
an unsuccessful attacker might be slain, he and his followers were not tried at
law. Only on one occasion was there an institutional change to meet the
hazards caused by civil war. The Barotse attribute their subjugation by the
Basuto to internal division resulting from civil war between north and south.
After the Barotse reconquered their homeland, to remove the possibility of a
similar war, it became a convention that the chief of the south should always
be a princess, for princesses are barred from the kingship. But civil wars
continued in the north.
Evans-Pritchard and I have concentrated in our analysis of African states
on the problem of civil wars.25 Briefly, these data demonstrate that constant
25. I deal with this problem, citing Evans-Pritchard's and other anthropologists' work,
as well as theories of other scholars from Aristotle onwards, in GLUCKmAN, ORDER AND
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civil war and rebellion are inherent attributes of states with relatively simple
technologies-technologies which force the people to spread widely for the
purposes of their husbandry. The wide and thin spread of people over the land,
where communications are poor and slow, necessitate that the ruler delegate
power over territorial sections of his kingdom to subordinates. Delegated
power is power given away. In many southern African tribes these posts of
subordinate power are hereditary. Though all the territorial sections may par-
ticipate in the circulation of tribute through the king, they are not held to-
gether by an integrating, differentiated, economic system. The inhabitants of
these sections then develop strong loyalties to their own leaders, and also
hostility toward other sections and the central government itself. Since
weapons are simple-spears, axes, clubs, bows and arrows, and shields20
and are owned by every man, each local authority has his private army to sup-
port his attempts at power, whether he be a prince trying to win the kingship,
or a local commoner leader trying to gain power and influence, possibly by
supporting as candidate for the throne a prince related to his own family. In
this view, dynastic struggles are not only competitions for power between
princes, but are also the culmination of tendencies arising from the tech-
nology, the economy, and the distribution of power throughout the state.
The pressures of these forces produced the continuous segmentation of a
number of African states and chiefdoms. In others, however, the sections
struggled for power around a kingship which, besides possibly organizing the
state, was elevated to a mystical plane as the symbol of unity. There was re-
current civil war in which the sections, by fighting for their own candidate,
remained attached to the kingship, though they might attack the reigning king.
As Evans-Pritchard has put it, the interest of a successfully rebellious section
in the kingship may be expressed "at the expense of the king's person"27-a
nice euphemism for regicide. I have analysed at length elsewhere 28 the political
arrangements which limit these civil wars to rivalry over the kingship, and
thus prevent regional segmentation. They consist largely of a series of al-
legiances linking each man to the kingship by a diverse set of loyalties to varied
officials. Since these lines of allegiance ignore territorial units and local group-
ings, every man is associated with different lots of his fellows in his various al-
legiances. These arrangements tend to prevent the emergence of solid unified
blocks of people in hostility to a particular king. But before we can understand
the full implications of this situation, it is necessary to examine how political
RBE.LUOTN IN TamAL AFRICA (1963) and GLUCKmAN, RuLs, LAW AND RrUAL in TRPmAL
AFRIcA (in press).
26. On the importance of this point see ANxDRZEJEWSKI, MlurnAy ORGANIZATION AIM
Socmrr (1953), following Max Weber.
27. EvANs-PzrrcHAD, THE DIVINE KINGSHIP OF THE SnIuLUX OF THE Nn.o'mc
SUDAN 38 (1948).
28. GLucx:umAN, CUsTOM AND CoNFICr IN AmRcA (1954) and GLucFMLA.n, THE
RIsE OF THE ZUU EmnmE (in press). For an excellent similar analysis see the final chapter
ii IfAQUET, THE PREMISE OF INEQUALTY IN RUANDA (1961).
19631 1531
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
struggles are determined by the law of royal succession and reflected in the
law of treason.
In many African states the successor to the throne is selected from among
the princes born to the many wives of the king in a patrilineal society, or to
his several sisters in a matrilineal society. In other states, the law of succession
usually contains propositions that are inconsistent with one another in that
they produce several contestants who can advance valid claims on the basis of
different rules. Even where the law of succession gives an apparently clear
and unambiguous principle, its application to the facts is often uncertain. For
example, among the Zulu and Swazi the heir is the eldest son of the great wife
of the king; but the great wife should have several different attributes which
may be variously distributed among several wives, and, hence it might be un-
certain who was the great wife.29 Thus, in almost all African tribes at any time,
and not only at the death of a king, there are more than one, and sometimes
several, claimants to the throne. Only in some great western African states
with considerably higher social and economic development has this volatile
situation been stabilized and then only through recognition of, and restriction
on, dynastic struggles by circulating the kingship through three dynasties of
the royal family.30
This uncertainty about who is to succeed a dead king is found in so many
kingdoms that obviously it must be related to the structure of the political
system as a whole. For example, the uncertainty is found in the states of Asia
and Europe during their early history. Kern stressed "the lack ... of a strict
claim to the throne for any individual member of the ruling line in the early
Middle Ages," especially in Germany.3 ' Maitland reported similarly that a
new king was elected by the Witan in Saxon England, usually from among
near kinsmen of the dead king by what he called "usage hardening into law."3 "
Rufus, Henry I, and Stephen all asserted their titles by election. Maitland
argued that the notion of hereditary right-dare I add "narrow" hereditary
right ?-made its appearance late in the day. He thought that it was the suc-
cession of Henry III which "did much towards fixing the notion of hereditary
rights," a notion which then continued for nearly two centuries.
The complexities of succession and politics in European history are most
entangled. I have summarized Maitland's view of the situation in England in
order to suggest that uncertainty over succession, and the possibility that most
claimants and pretenders can cloak their rebellions under at least fictitiously
valid titles, are not necessarily symptoms of a weak kingship. Maitland con-
cluded that the fact "that to the very end of the [Saxon] period the kingship
is not strictly hereditary, but elective-that a power also of deposing a king
has been exercised as late as the days of Ethelred the Unready, is really rather
29. KUPER, AN AFRICAN ARIsTOCRAcY 88-104 (1947).
30. NADEL, A BLAcK BYZANTIUM (1942); SMITH, GOVERNMENT IN ZAZZAU (1961).
31. KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 35 (1939).
32. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 59-60, 97-100 (Paperback
ed. 1961).
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a mark of constitutional weakness, of a dangerous feudalism, than of popular
liberty:-the Crown itself may become the prize of the rebellious vassal."-m
With all respect, I submit this is not the case: for the rebellious vassal seems
always to have put forward someone with royal title to the kingship. Lady
Shenton ascribes to the period of the Wars of the Roses inevitable civil war
with the administration "discredited in popular opinion. Magnates with reti-
nues swollen by men who had seen service in the French wars, were rebellious
and nervous, likely to make trouble at any moment. They were bound together
in great family alliances which might easily convert a personal quarrel into a
major civil war."33 .5 Magnates changed sides rapidly, as Stanley did at the last
moment at Bosworth.34 Yet these shifts of noblemen seem on the whole to have
been mobilized always behind a contender from the royal line. In his great
study, Feudal Society, Bloch asserted that "after the recovery which marked
the reign of Henry II, the aim of the magnates in their rebellions was hence-
forth much less to tear the kingdom asunder than to dominate it.".1
Uncertainty over succession to the kingship is logically accompanied by per-
sistent rebellions.36 Perhaps it is also logical that in this situation commoners
who fight behind a prince claiming the throne, or who support their own chief
essaying at power, were not considered to be guilty of treason in its modem
sense. Among the Zulu and Barotse, even though commoners fighting behind
their rebellious leader might be slain in the heat of the battle, those who sur-
vived would not afterwards be tried for treachery. Zulu were under duty to sup-
port their immediate prince, as in feudal times, according to Bloch and Jol-
liffe, a vassal had to fight for his lord against the king. Bloch reports that
when Hugh Capet retook Melum in 991, the viscount who defended the
castle and his wife were hanged, but he then suggests that this was because
the viscount's superior lord was in the royal camp, and he had thus broken
fealty, rather than because he had rebelled against the king. But the king's own
followers insisted that he should pardon the knights who had defended the
castle, for as vassals of the viscount, in supporting his revolt they had dis-
played their "virtue."3 7 Pollock and Maitland cite a similar situation: "Henry
II, for example, spared the rebels of 1173, though he had thoroughly subdued
them and had been within an ace of losing his kingdom. Never was there any-
thing that we could call a proscription of defeated partizans."' s
The legal basis of the right of a feudatory to revolt in feudal times was seen
as reaction to a lord's denial of justice, even if the lord were king. Such a re-
volt was not a rejection of the kingship: Jolliffe writes that "no English mag-
33. Id. at 59-60.
33.5 5 CH A Rs'S ENCYcLOPEDIA, English History 255-56 (1950).
34. Ibid.
35. BLOCH, FEUDAL SocirrY 431 (1961).
36. Bloch says of Germany that "no reign in fact was free from rebellions." Id. at 427.
37. Id. at 233-34. See also JOLLIFFE, THE CoNsTrruTTxoxAL HISTORY OF MEDIAWvAL
ENGLAND 152-65 (1937).
38. Pou.occ & MAIrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 406 (2d ed. 1905).
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nate of the feudal age ever formed the ambition of breaking loose from the
community of English law, and turning his fee into an independent state."OD
Jolliffe also points out that it was the reigning king's claim to obedience which
was nullified if he failed to fulfill his trust to guard national custom:
The maxim that the power of a king who acts as a tyrant is illegitimate,
which almost exhausts contemporary theorizing about monarchy, and to
us seems to be an ineffectual truism, was thus in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries the cornerstone of legal security. . . . [W]hen refused legal
redress, the aggrieved party is entirely within his rights in declaring his
obligation of vassalage at an end, making war upon his lord, and coercing
him by every means in his power to do him right.40
Dowling similarly stresses that before Magna Carta, the royal power was
checked only "by the extraordinary feudal remedy of diffidation, which per-
mitted a vassal to fight his lord to protect himself from injustices in breach of
the feudal (lord-man) contract."41 The right of armed redress was reaffirmed
by King John in Chapter 61 of Magna Carta. John empowered the Barons to
elect twenty-five of their number:
who shall with their whole power, observe, keep, and cause to be observed,
the peace and liberties which we have granted them, and have confirmed
by this our present charter, in this manner; that is to say, if we, or our
Justiciary, or our bailiffs or any of our officers, shall have injured any-
one in anything, or shall have violated any article of the peace or security
and the injury shall have been shown to four of the aforesaid twenty-five
Barons, the said four Barons shall come to us, or to our Justiciary if we
be out of the kingdom, and making known to us the excess committed,
petition that we cause that excess to be redressed without delay. And
if we shall not have redressed the excess, or if we have been out of the
kingdom, our Justiciary shall not have redressed it within the term of
forty days .... the aforesaid four Barons shall lay that cause before the
residue of the twenty-five Barons; and they, the twenty-five Barons, with
the community of the whole land, shall distress and harass us by all the
ways in which they are able; that is to say, by the taking of our castles,
lands and possessions, and by any other means in their power, until the
excess is or shall have been redressed, according to their verdict, saving
harmless our persons and the persons of our Queen and children, and
when it hath been redressed they shall behave to us as they have done be-
fore. And whoever of our land pleaseth may swear that he will obey the
commands of the aforesaid twenty-five Barons in accomplishing all the
things aforesaid, and that with them he will harass us to the utmost of
his power; and we publicly and freely give leave to everyone to swear who
is willing to swear; and we will never forbid anyone to swear. But all
those of our land, who, of themselves, and of their own accord, are un-
willing to swear to the twenty-five Barons, to distress and harass us to-
gether with them, we will compel them by our command to swear as
aforesaid. 42
39. JOLnTiF, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 157 (1937).
40. Id. at 157-58, 446-47.
41. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (4th ed. 1950).
42. Id. at 9.
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Dowling comments that:
Chapter 61, omitted from reissues due to its largely revolutionary char-
acter, was crucial. It tackled the problem of enforcing the contract be-
tween king and people in a situation where former kings had hardly
scrupled to break their engagements and where the present king's faith-
lessness was common knowledge. Here, for the first time, a device was ad-
vanced which went beyond the sanctions of morality, religion, or even
feudal contract. The provision of a standing committee of baronial watch-
dogs to report and seek redress was perhaps impractical but it was the
first real achievement in a long effort to attain the central feature of
the English constitution: a mode of making government responsive to the
will of the governed without resort to civil war. Like most of the great
steps to limited government, Magna Carta was the product of a revolu-
tionary situation, the stand of certain classes, here barons and clergy,
against deprivation of property, life or important rights. Considering this,
the moderation and reasonableness seem amazing. Despite the revolution-
ary situation, the king was left his dignity and power, and the whole
emphasis, as in the Charters of Liberties, and indeed almost all later
English constitutional documents, was on specific, concrete details to be
mended rather than on pious generalizations about justice and rights.
There was no wild anarchical doctrine, no vengefulness.4 3
A limitation on vengefulness certainly inheres in the explicit provision that
after the barons have redressed wrong, they agree to restore John to the
throne, and by implication not to enthrone another member of the royal family
in his place. However, Dowling's characterization of Chapter 61 as revolu-
tionary does not seem appropriate for this period of medieval history. Rather,
Chapter 61 involved a conservative entrenchment of the existing right to revolt
in order to redress a denial of justice. Although its objectives are somewhat
limited, civil war may still be invoked, and, indeed, with royal approval. The
right not only of the barons, but also of other approved men, to levy war on
the king is more than protected; it is almost turned into a duty in the final
quoted provision of Chapter 61. The failure to quote this Chapter in later is-
sues of the Charter was not because it was too revolutionary, but, I under-
stand, because the next king shortly succeeded as a boy aged nine and the
barons themselves exercised power. The right to revolt remained, since, in
Jolliffe's words, after the defeat of'Richard III, it was still clear that "a bad or
incapable reign broke the bond between the king and the lieges, and that the
throne could be claimed and filled with their [the magnates'] assent, was im-
memorial custom, hardly a departure from constitutional precedent, and cer-
tainly not the creation of a new monarchy."44 Hence, provided war was proper-
ly declared, in medieval Europe armed insurrection against the king was
hardly an offence. 45 It dearly was not "treason" which could be prosecuted at
law.
43. Id. at 10.
44. JoLT.nz, op. cit. stpra note 39, at 446, 447.
45. 3 HOLDSWoRTH, A IISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923), citing also 2 PoLocK
& MAIuTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 503, 504 (1st ed. 1895).
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Barotse and Zulu carry this doctrine even further: revolt by a prince is
legitimate even if he is not wronged because it is part of the legitimate role
of princeship to desire to be king. Of course a rebellious prince makes out a
case for his revolt to enhance the likelihood of support. In the Barotse's own
theory, despite actual evidence to the contrary, the state is always on the verge
of revolt. A new king, they say, must antagonize councillors all the time, for
those who were powerful in his predecessor's reign then treated him as a
prince, and may find it difficult to accept his new status; and above all, those
councillors who made him king will not respect him adequately. I-Ie must turn
on them, while he must conciliate his enemies. Barotse warn again and again:
"Never expect gratitude from a king."
The important fact is that these struggles for power culminated in rebellions
against individual incumbents, and not in revolutions to overturn the whole
structure of offices. Aristotle touched on the difference between plots against
rulers and plots to alter the political system; unfortunately he did not examine
the social conditions in which these varied conspiracies occurred. Historians
also stressed the frequent occurrences, in mediaeval times, of rebellions instead
of revolutions, but without attempting to explain this by reference to common
social factors present in all these states. In Africa, as in the Europe of Anglo-
Saxon and feudal times, there were states whose structure endured through
some generations despite recurrent civil wars; therefore, civil war has to be
seen as an inherent attribute of the structure of the state. It is not enough to
point, as Maitland and Dowling have done, to the undoubted weaknesses which
arose from the presence of several claimants with valid claims to the throne.
Laws of succession which indicate several possible heirs, or which out of un-
certainty and ambiguity can be interpreted by contenders to back their claims,
seem to be logically associated with situations where the state's territorial sec-
tions, possessing their own armies, are not held together by developed com-
munications and integrating economic exchange. The granting to royal rivals
and subordinate magnates of the privilege of waging legitimate war against
the king, without committing "treason," also seems to fit logically into this
situation. Again, it is not enough to isolate this privilege and dismiss it as a
sign of weakness in the state's organization: like the law of succession, the law
of treason must be viewed as one aspect of a policy which contains a stable
equilibrium inside a cycle of disturbance and recovery.
In England, it was first made treason to wage war on the king in 1352; much
later, under Queen Anne, the law of succession was so amended that it became
treason to urge that there could be more than one claimant of the throne. The
circumstances which led to the eventual repudiation of the laws legitimising re-
bellion illuminate the social conditions which originally sustained those laws.
This brief summary of the factors inducing the laws' repudiation is particularly
hazardous since none of the authoritative studies relate adequately the changing
social conditions to the statute of Edward III in 1352, which, for the first time,
recognized as a high treason levying war against the king. It is significant that
this critical change whereby waging war on the king became a treason was en-
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acted in 1352, the year after the Statute of Labourers. The latter legislation
was a more or less abortive attempt to cope with the better bargaining power
of serfs and town artisans, after the Black Death had so reduced their numbers
that men became again much more valuable than land. As trade expanded, so-
cia and economic conflict between master and men destroyed the harmony of
te medieval City Guild. The Statute of Labourers failed because masters and
farmers themselves broke its regulations to get labour.40 All this disturbance
followed on struggles between landed magnates and city burghers. Sporadic
unrest culminated in the great Peasants' Revolt of 1381, in the youth of Richard
II, and by a new statute it was made treason to begin a riot.
There was clearly no abrupt change from one type of regime, dominated by
the right of the magnates to levy war on the king, to another in which fear of
revolt against the state's authority and the state's powerful leaders became
dominant. Changes had been made on the statute books, so that it had be-
come treasonable to initiate a riot after the 1381 rising. In addition, it w%-as
enacted that it should be treason "not only to compass the king's death, but
also his deposition or the rendering up by anyone of his liege homage; and that
anyone who procured or counselled the repeal of the statutes (making these
acts treasonable) in that Parliament should be guilty of treason." But the king
could not maintain these edicts against the pressure of his magnates, and
Henry IV was compelled to have them repealed.4 7 The forces in the "feudal"
regime, with its divisive struggles around the kingship, were still too strong.
In practice, the history of the Wars of the Roses shows that the new law
condemning war on the king as treasonable was not consistently invoked
against rebellious nobles, and certainly not against their followers. Most no-
tably, after the Battle of Shrewsbury in 1403 it was not considered possible
"to go to extremes" in punishing the rebels. Furthermore, when the lords in
Parliament tried Northumberland, who had been arrested while marching at
the head of an army to attack the king, they specifically considered Edward
III's Statute of Treasons of 1352 and yet held that Northumberland was not
guilty under it. He was convicted of trespass only, and not of treason.48 The
changes in economic and political relations which occurred in the middle of the
fourteenth century, and which may have inspired a new view of treason, did
not entirely eliminate the feudal system and the ancient view of treason ap-
propriate to it. Two quite inconsistent views on levying internal war co-
existed.
I have suggested that a law of succession under which rival claimants could
assert ostensibly valid claims to the throne was consistent with a law of treason
which did not condemn the levying of war against the king. I cannot in this
lecture trace the further course of struggles between different contestants for
the English-and later the British-crown. From the Tudor period it is
complicated by religious strife and by tendencies which culminated in the
46. TREmV-YAN, ENLISH SOCIAL HSTORY 9-11,38 and passin (1942).
47. HoIDswoRTH, A HIsToRY OF ENGLisHr LANw 450 (3d ed. 1923).
48. JoLLirE, THE CO NsTIruTioAL HISTORY OF MED A4-VA. ENGLA D 425 (1937).
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Cromwellian revolt and the Restoration. But it is some support for my argu-
ment that the law of royal succession did not denote a single "true" heir, with
other claimants barred under fear of charge of treason, until the reign of
Queen Anne. In her reign, two further species of treason were created by stat-
ute: it became treason to hinder the succession to the crown of the person en-
titled thereto under the Act of Settlement, or to maintain in writing the in-
validity of the line of succession to the crown established by the Act of Settle-
ment. Thus, it may be that only when a state is becoming integrated by in-
creasing dependence of its segments on one another and the whole politico-
economic system, is a single clear legitimate succession made possible, and civil
war arising from adherence to two or more claimants eliminated.
Where does this tentative examination of the laws of treason and royal suc-
cession lead? My argument is that we should attempt to relate changes in these
laws to other kinds of changes, and not ascribe them simply to internal de-
velopments in ideas about state power. Pollock and Maitland contrasted the
1352 edict that levying war was treason with the Dictum of Kenilworth which
in 1266 was issued as "an essentially temporary provision relating to the
punishment of insurgents," 49 though Jolliffe called it "the sentence upon the
baronial regime. . .", opening as it did with "the reassertion of the personal
authority of the monarch . . . ."o But Pollock and Maitland conclude that
this Dictum shines out in startling contrast to the attainders of the fifteenth
century.
In part we may account for this by saying, if this be true, that men be-
came more cruel as time went on; but also we ought to see that there
had been a real progress, the development of a new political idea. Treason
had been becoming a crime against the state; the supreme crime against
the state is the levying of war against it. A right, or duty, of rising against
the king and compelling him to do justice can no longer be preached in
the name of law; and this is well.rl
But is it enoligh merely to ascribe these critical changes to the development of
a new political idea? Whence came the new idea? Can the earlier laws con-
cerning treason be explained by the awkward situation of kings of England
who were lieges in other capacities of the king of France, and whose wars in
France might have been called treasonable, if they named as treasonable their
own rebellious lords? Or was England in the latter half of the fourteenth
century undergoing a change, as Trevelyan's summary account suggests, to
the kind of "organic interdependence" in which the division into territorial
segments would be countered by the integrating effects of a more differentiated
economic system? If horizontal stratification in terms of economic interests
and cleavages had begun to emerge, it may well have accounted for a law un-
der which in practice some, and not all, kinds of civil war were held to be
treasonable.
49. 1 PoLuocic & MAI mLA D, Tn HisToRy oF ENGiSu LAW 180 (2d ed, 1923),
50. Jo=urE, op. cit. supra note 48 at 300-01.
51. 2 PoLocx & MAXTLAND, THF HISTORY OF EiLsu LAW 506 (2d ed. 1905).
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I have thus far confined myself to the recognition of armed insurrection as a
treason. "Treasons," of course, were in English law a whole class of offenses,
distinguished from felonies and misdemeanours. Early treasons, I make bold
to say, were offenses against the dignity of the king's person and the kingship-
adultery with his wife, violation of his eldest daughter, clipping of his money,
and usurpation of royal privileges. The definition of treason to cover such of-
fenses was most marked in Africa. Dr. Southwold tells me that in Buganda the
king pardoned a page who attempted his life, but a man who lifted his eyes
from the ground when a queen was passing would be slain instantly. Among
the Barotse, to use the eland tail for a fly-switch, or to wear a leopard skin or
ivory bangles, to decorate one's fence with royal lashing or one's implements
with royal markings, to use a royal name for one's dog or dugout, to commit
adultery with a queen, to speak ill of the king, were all more heinous and less
forgivable offences than to rise in armed revolt against the king. Among the
statutes passed by the king under the British in 1929 was one protecting the
exclusive right of the king to special insignia and decorations. The very weak-
ness in the internal integration of the state seems to heighten the kingship's
symbolic and ritual value as a tool for unifying the state's disparate sections.
Hence trespasses on the symbolic and ritual insignia and exclusive privileges
of the king and his kingship are grave offences. The nearer the king's style of
life to that of his subjects, the more important are conventions, modes of
etiquette, and apparently insignificant material appurtenances, in distinguishing
king and kingship from the commonalty.
We now have the background in which we can interpret the basis of the
Barotse's theory of power. In many African states, such as the Zulu kingdom,
great councillors of the king had armies to support them; they were princes
and rulers of counties. Against these potentially hostile leaders with their in-
dependent powers the king had to rely on his own private advisers, the stewards
who ran the capital, and the commanders of regiments composed of men re-
cruited in age-sets from the whole nation. The Barotse were at approximately
the same stage of technological and economic development as the Zulu, but the
organization of their council was very different. No great men with inde-
pendent armies sat in the Barotse tribunal. Their nation was not divided for
administrative purposes into territorial divisions. All the men of the nation
were attached for purposes of jurisdiction, war and some state labour works,
to different great councillors-of-the-right. Nor did the men thus attached to a
particular councillor reside in adjacent villages, and this was especially true
in the flood-plain itself. Men of neighboring villages, and sometimes even
members of the same village, might be attached to different councillors. The
members of an administrative unit attached to a senior councillor, which I
term a "political sector," were thus widely dispersed in the nation. In result,
then, a councillor or a prince did not have a localized group of men, who could
develop strong loyalty to him. Moreover, since councillors were deposed, or
promoted fairly regularly to higher titles, or moved to other tasks, there was
even less chance of any substantial loyalty developing. In addition, all the men
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thus attached to councillors-of-the-right were also attached to stewards and to
royals, but in such a way that not all the men who shared attachment to a
leader on the right were associated together in attachment to a steward, or to
a prince. Three major sets of attachments thus cut the nation into diverse
groups-groups in which men did not constantly associate together. The
Barotse took seriously their loyalties to their lords in the capital but those
loyalties were divided.
When I studied the Barotse they were working with a territorial system of
administration created for and to some extent by the British Administration. "
I was able to work out the structure of their old system from earlier writings
on the Barotse and from what they themselves told me. But it is difficult to
assess precisely how the old system worked, though it still operated within the
new system. Jurisdiction for settlement of disputes was established by al-
legiance to councillors-of-the-right. If a dispute could not be settled in consulta-
tion with important persons, two litigants of the same political sector went to
the capital where their case was heard at the courtyard in the capital of their
senior councillor, supported by other councillors of that sector. If men of dif-
ferent political sectors had a dispute, the case was tried by a combined court of
councillors of both sectors, sitting in the courtyard of the senior-.e., the one
who sat nearer to the king. Appeal lay to the full council, which heard the case
anew. The Ngambela was also owner of a sector, but as he was head of the
full council, cases involving members of his sector were heard tinder the
presidency of his own deputy, the "Ngambela" to the Ngambela; otherwise
the Ngambela himself would have had to listen on appeal to the case he had
already judged as head of a court, and then it would not have been an appeal.
"How can the same man judge an appeal against himself?" ask the Barotse.
This applied only to the Ngambela, the titular head of the council. Other
councillors who had heard their sector's cases at lower levels still sat as judges in
full council.
It is worth noting, however, that in practice an aggrieved person could take
his complaints through his stewards to a royal or a queen, to plead on his
behalf; and I have recorded one case where a man feeling violently aggrieved
by his immediate lords, and prevented by his wife from committing suicide in
protest, brought his complaint directly to the king by going through a steward
other than his regular one.
The political sectors were also the units in which men assembled for war
or purposes of state labour. But to work for the king and his queens, the nation
was mobilized through the stewards; these stewards also mobilized the Barotse
for work on behalf of the prince or princess to whom they were attached.
Lest you wonder whether this complex system of political sectors is typically
African, there are reports of similarly intricate African systems of political
administration. Even among the Zulu, while commoner chiefs ruled territorial
areas, the men of these counties were attached to the king's queens, and hence
52. See GLUCKMAN, ESSAYS ON Lozi LAND AND ROYAL PROPERTY (1943).
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to the sons of these queens, in a system by which adjacent areas held allegiance
to different princes-so that in revolts involving royalty, the country did not
side behind a particular prince in a solid block liable to secede from the na-
tion.5 3
In an analysis of a Northern Nigerian kingdom, 4 Dr. M. G. Smith has dis-
tinguished administrative action from political action. Political action may be
regarded as a system of competition for power to control resources and men,
and matters of public policy. This involves competition, coalition, compromise,
and so forth. Political action thus aims at securing control over the means of
managing the public affairs of the group and its component sections. One of
these means is the system of administrative action, through which the busi-
ness of government is carried on. Here the organization is hierarchial and
authoritative, for it typically deals with problems of order and with the asso-
ciated protection of rights and enforcement of obligations. It is a powerful poli-
tical tool. The distinction between administrative and political action is analy-
tic, of course, because in all polities the administrative apparatus acquires
power, and political action involves use of that apparatus. Through the history
of Europe, the political and administrative systems became segregated from
one another. However, in African states competitive struggles for power tend
to occur between the very persons who occupy a series of organized positions
in relation to one another in the hierarchy of administration. As stated, the
chief of a Zulu county was an officer of the king ruling his county for the king
and a contender for power backed by the army of his county. The Barotse do
not distinguish between political and administrative systems; indeed, they
describe them both with one word. In Barotseland, except for a short period,
the councillors organized for administration in the hierarchy were also the
main contenders for power around the king, and, save for small groups of
their own followers, they did not have private armies. When the men assembled
in their armies for military or state-labour service, they did so in public, to
serve the king. As allegiance and authority were concentrated in the adminis-
trative system at the capital, where the powerful councillors spent most of their
time, struggles for power were concentrated there. Because of the relatively un-
developed economy, and the other factors I have listed, the political system still
contained strong tendencies to segmentation, which appeared on the surface in
dynastic rivalry and rebellion, actual or potential-potential in the sense that
the threat of a rebellion hung all the time over the king, and deposition over
a councillor(as an election theoretically hangs over the British Prime Minis-
ter). The various kinds of councillors, and shifting alliances of councillors, did
not represent groups differentiated from one another by varied roles in a com-
plex economic system, and bound to one another in that mutual interde-
53. M _ur, THE PREAMSE OF INEQUALrTY IN RUANDA (1961) brings out brilliantly
how this cross-cutting of allegiances in Ruanda gave stability to their system.
54. M. G. SmFr:, Govm-cemlmr IN ZAzzAu, 1800-1950 (1960). I follow Smith, but
amend his analysis somewhat, and necessarily for lack of space I simplify it substantially.
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pendence which Durkheim called organic solidarity.5 In the end, each council-
lor or steward in the capital represented neither the interests of a territorial
group nor a functional group, but only himself. This probably explains why
relations among the councillors were marked by incessant personal intrigues,
Groups of councillors still move about, whispering to one another about im-
portant and unimportant affairs and passing information around in limited cir-
cuits, in a way I never observed among the Zulu. The Barotse call this whis-
pering kusebela, a verb whose root also describes slandering and calumniating.
Other councillors always fear that vital information is being kept from them
and that the whispers they do not hear must be to their disadvantage. Every-
one tries to join the series of inner circles which they believe to exist. Of
course, the administration of justice is palpably carried on in public, and so is
the administration of affairs. For example, the head of a court periodically
stops a trial to announce some matter and seek the opinion of his fellows, or to
tell them what has been decided. But there is a feeling that intrigues go on be-
hind the scenes and the circles of information are being closed. And these in-
trigues focus, through factions of councillors, on selected princes, since each
prince is a potential king.
In Barotseland, contentions for power were in fact rarely marked by the
direct threat of the spear. Instead, they were pursued in these secretive negotia-
tions. I suggest that this is one of the main sources of the highly elaborated
Barofse theory of power. King and Ngambela, the Ngambela and his deputy,
the councillors-of-the-right and the stewards and the princes-all of these are
seen as involved in constant intrigues for power and they thus come to repre-
sent the different categories of persons who comprise the nation. And these
intrigues for power are absorbed into their discharge of administrative duties
for the state and the manner in which they represent the interests of de-
pendents in the administrative hierarchy. Hence each administrative position,
which is also a position of power, is seen as posed in ceremonial opposition to
a series of other administrative positions; and the interests of the subordinates
of each position have to be represented against it. The result is an elaborate
network of administrative offices and councils to which the people of the na-
tion are linked in a number of sets of crosscutting ties of allegiance and op-
position. Out of this situation, in practice there does seem to emerge consider-
able stability for the state as a whole.
The dominant position of the capital in Barotse polity appears to have an
ecological basis, and therefore some economic support. The river-routes of
Barotseland center in the plain. The products of the great flood plain differ
markedly from the products of all the surrounding woodland regions. Trade
lies between the plain and the woodland regions as a whole, and between
various parts of the plain, but not between the various woodland regions. Thus
every surrounding woodland region is linked by profitable exchange with
the plain, while the different woodland regions are not interlinked with one
55. DURKHEim, DE LA DIVISION Du TRAVAIL SOCIAL (1893).
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another. The plain dominates the economy of the region by controlling what
differentiation there is in the general economy; and this may explain why the
tribe which inhabits the plain dominates the region politicallyr 0
Within the plain itself, the effect of the flood on peoples' lives probably ac-
counted for the concentration of power, as well as administration, in the
capital. As people moved between their dry-season and flood-season villages,
many of the inhabitants of villages disperse, going to different villages along
the margin where they seek accommodation with various relatives or friends.
Some members of a village may go to the western margin, while others go to
the eastern margin. Young men may escort the cattle to graze at small plains
in the woodlands, either camping or staying with relatives or bloodbrothers or
friends. Some villages move as a unit, and accordingly many plain villages
have their margin counterparts. But even then, neighbouring villages may re-
locate at widely separated places on the margins. Some people remain perman-
ently in the plain through the flood, despite its discomforts; others may move
within the plain to temporary camps on uninhabited patches of higher land,
or go in various years to temporary camps at different points on the margins.
A village in mid-plain may move to a village nearer the margin, whose in-
habitants have moved to the margin itself. The total effect is that through the
course of a year, the same people are not associated in territorial units. I be-
lieve that this fact accounts for the absence of a highly organized territorial ad-
ministrative system among the Lozi of the plain, even though small territorial
areas have names and its inhabitants profess allegiance to some prominent
royal in the neighourhood. In the absence of a territorial administrative sys-
tem, we have the intricate system of political sectors leading to the council in
the capital. The result is that the capital dominates political life. Even the
outer provinces, although organized along territorial lines, were not tightly ad-
ministered as territories. The capital only sent representatives to live among
them in order to oversee the forwarding of tribute. Just like other Barotse
people, the provincial people were attached to councillors in the capital.
Since the powerful Barotse administrators, who were also rulers of the na-
tion, did not have their own regimented and localized bodies of followers, there
was a general tendency to establish an intricate marking of status to dif-
ferentiate these individuals. I have explained that in states like that of the Zulu
the court is filled with great magnates who attend in their own right because
they rule over counties. They come as authorities with private armies. This
was not true of the Barotse leaders, which may explain why, in the capital,
councillors entered into an established hierarchy of titles. It is a general rule
that the less are the real bases of differentiation between the roles of persons
in a society, the more social conventions will exist to mark slight differences of
roles. I have developed this argument elsewhere to explain why tribal societies
have more elaborate ceremonies to mark changes of status than modem in-
56. I have summarized these differences in GLUcKMAN, THE Lozi OF BEOrSnwD IN
NoRTH-WEsTERN PHODEsrA (1951), from a fuller account of the situation, with detailed
evidence, in GLUCxmAN, THE EcoNomtY OF THE CENTRAL BAnorsE PLAw (1941).
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dustrial societies have.57 In kinship groups which act to achieve a multiplicity
of purposes, the entry of persons on each role directed to a different purpose
tends to be marked by the multitude of conventions and taboos which are
characteristic of tribal society. These indicate what role a person is playing at
a particular moment. Roles, so to speak, are segregated by customs and con-
ventions, and by elaborate mystical theories. Thus, since there is relatively little
actual difference between officials in the Barotse council, conventions, taboos,
and an elaborate theory of power, attach to the titles within the council and
segregate them from one another.
I have already suggested, in discussing the laws of treason, that the less the
king is separated from his people by material circumstances, the more elabor-
ate will be his insignia and special conventions, and the more heinous trespass
on his privileges. The similar tendency in this direction within the king's palace
and the Barotse council is strengthened because in this type of society they are
the aim of most ambitious men. In the palace household there is, as seemingly
in all royal households in relatively undifferentiated states, a multiplication of
offices and officials, and of servants, each with his special duties, secular and
ritual. There are royal priests, fishermen and hunters, royal attendants in the
bedchambers, caretakers for dugouts and dogs, praise-singers and jesters. In
the council many more titles exist than are necessary for actual administration
in order to provide for all the ambitious. There are no barriers to upward
mobility, and the brave and able secure appointments of some kind, while mar-
riage to a princess is a short cut to appointment. The conventions of the titles
include ideas of their being linked to one another in terms of their association
with Barotse history, for various titles represent ancestral kings, princes and
princesses, and great councillors. The titles, conciliar and royal, are thus dis-
tinguished from one another since each represents an episode in the past which
has contributed to the cumulative build-up of the Barotse nation. In this
legendary hallowing of titles a dual measure of authority is involved: those
near to the reigning king and recent kings are in practice most powerful, those
representing the early kings are most sanctified. Thus varied measures of
power and control of power are embodied in the conventional separation of
titles, complicating further the elaborate, and seemingly unusual, theory of
power I am attempting to explain.
I have now, after my excursion through the laws of rebellion, treason, and
royal succession, indicated the lines along which I would seek an answer to the
ultimate problem posed in this lecture. That problem is, can we relate the
elaborate Barotse theory of power to the Barotse mode of production, stand-
ards of living, and political organization? Barotse ideas of power state a
thesis, found in all states as far as I know, that power corrupts; but they seem
to me to have an exaggerated terror of this corruption. Certainly the manner
in which this theory is worked out through their several sets of hierarchies of
office, through their chambers, through the relation of superior office-holders
57. For the full exposition of, and the supporting evidence for, this thesis see Gluckman,
Les Rites de Passage, ESSAYS ON THE MITUAL OF SOCIAL RELATIONS (Gluckman ed. 1962).
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and their deputies, and through royal and counciliar authorities as sanctuaries
from one another, does not appear to be entirely justified by the facts of their
life. The limited technological equipment and the egalitarian standards of
living do not lead to that clear cleavage of interests between king and royal
family, and commoners, from which the whole theory stems. Cleavages of
interest run vertically through society, rather than horizontally across it; and
actual power relations are manifested in tendencies to recurrent, legitimate re-
bellion, with the associated laws of treason and succession which I have dis-
cussed. I have, therefore, suggested that the doctrines of power which attach to
each type of office and the several offices within each type, are conventionalized
means of elaborating differences between the powerful men of the nation.
These men do not come to their positions of power as representatives of either
territorial sections with their own armies, or as representatives of functional
groups. Yet through them operate the divisive vertical tendencies which I have
described as attributes of this type of tribal economy and polity. The statement
of the power of each office in relation to other offices is thus part of its insignia,
just as the office's role in incapsulating Barotse history, as well as its special
praise-songs, and in some cases its special dress, salutes, and other privileges,
are part of its insignia. The elaborated theory of power helps to distinguish
positions where there are, in reality, few differences.
In general terms, I suggest that the less the material bases which underlie
struggles for power within a system where those who compete for this power
are also the personnel of administration, the more elaborate is likely to be the
doctrine of power. I have not -been able to check this suggestion, since no other
student of a tribal state has discussed its theory of power in detail, and it is
difficult to extract facts of critical importance for such an analysis. Mly col-
leagues who have studied African states were not interested in these problems,
and they do not outline clearly who in a rebellion sided with which party, or
what was the law of treason under which losing parties were punished. What
does seem certain is that the more the divisions of a state are vertical, rather
than horizontal, the more is native theorising about authority and power con-
centrated on the mystical attributes of office. The mediaeval European concern
with the relation between king and God seems to fit here. Through the centur-
ies emphasis came to be placed increasingly on analysis of real bases of power.
This would fit with Durkheim's view of the development of types of religion.
I see the Barotse theory as an efflorescence out of this general structure of
"early philosophy."
In Africa, the answer to these problems may arise from arranging states in a
morphological series,58 ranging from the symbolic ritual kingship of the Shil-
lik, which lacks administrative powers, but represents the unity of the nation,
to the great states of West Africa, with their large capitals and slave planta-
tions-states well characterized by Nadel's description of Nupe as a black
58. I have attempted such an analysis in Chapter IV of GLucKFMAI, Rui., LAw M.-
RrruvA. m TPamAL Socimry (in press).
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Byzantium.5 s .5 A step beyond the Shilluk are the small chiefdoms of South
Africa, which were subject to constant segmentation. Then came states like
the Zulu and Bemba, where princes and chiefs administer for the king ter-
ritorial counties but mobilize armies of their followers in support of their at-
tempts at power. Next I would place the Barotse-type system, dominated by
what I call "politics of the capital." Buganda also may fall within this cate-
gory. In these systems the council of the king does not consist of landed
magnates, but of a number of title-holders appointed to their positions by the
king in council. They are not specialized bureaucrats, since the kingdoms still
have the limited technology and economy which I take as a master explanatory
principle. The king moves people between offices to which are attached estates
and followers, and no great man establishes permanent ties with a loyal body
of followers. Social mobility of the brave and able is still possible. The next
type may be the "caste" states of the cattle-keeping conquerors of peasants,
like Ruanda. Here there are caste-like categories specializing in different sub-
sistence activities-still subsistence only-but there is a radical restriction of
the rights of the peasants to positions of high power. Significantly, we find
here, in addition to dynastic struggle and rebellion, reports of a religious
revolutionary movement of protest among the peasants, such as is not reported
from the other states, and which offers parallels with the millenarian move-
ments of the early Middle Ages."9 The West African states, like Dahomey,
Nupe and Zazzau, have a more differentiated economy with slave labour and
external trade on a large scale. There exist great landed magnates, with town
and country houses, and factions of aristocrats who vie, according to one bare
statement, for the support of a city mob in a capital of 50,000 people. Mercen-
aries and mercenary generals enter the arena of politics. Dynastic struggles
still exist, but one account reports a large-scale peasants' revolt. Perhaps con-
sideration of the African states in such categories will deepen our understand-
ing of the interrelations between revolts and how people adhered to rebellious
leaders in these states, and the associated laws of treason and succession, as
well as indigenous theories of power.
58.5 NADFL, A BLACK BYZANTIUM (1942).
59. Cornw, THE Punsuor OFTHE MIuLENIUM (1957).
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